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The banking industry mega-mergers announced last
Julyand August are unprecedented in size. Analysts
say others will surely follow. Many of the same analysts
reassure us that huge banking combinations and indus-
try-wide consolidation are natural, inevitable, good for
banking and good for the economy. The Bush Admini-
stration asserts that encouraging big banks to get bigger
will level the financial industry's domestic playing field
and enhance the global position of U.S. banks.
Rather than leveling the playing field, this bank-
centered approach will only preserve its tilt. Underregu-
lated firms, particularly giant financial companies, will
continue playing a disruptive, lowest-common-denomi-
nator role at the fringe of the credit system. The bigger-
is-better solution won't lay a glove on the underlying
reasons the financial industry and lenders of all sizes
flocked to ill-considered speculative investments over
the past decade. The real culprits are regulatory inequal-
ity, weak supervision and decontrolled interest rates-
not "too many banks."
There is little evidence that increased size will make
U.S.-based banks more competitive in global markets-
or that such a result might yield benefits in this country.
For example, the proposed NationsBank merger will
produce the largest bank in recent U.S. history to have
virtually no international presence.
In addition to our skepticism about banking consoli-
dation, the industry mega-mergers announced this summer
raise three specific concerns: financial instability, eco-
nomic dislocation, and concentration of economic power.
Financial Instability. These deals may well destabilize
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an already unstable industry, thereby increasing govern-
ment's costs for bank failures, roiling financial markets
and sapping public confidence. The performance of
these mega-merger partners and the overall track record
of large banks send ominous signals.
The primary causes of big-bank inefficiencies are not
external factors or regulation. Several large banks have
circumvented regulatory barriers to product and geo-
graphic expansion. The results often seem more impres-
sive as legal stratagems than financial ventures. Given
their experiences, many employees of big banks agree
that their firms' inefficiencies result from the very inter-
nal conditions-such as excessive bureaucracy and rigid-
ity, and perverse reward structures-that mega-mergers
will magnify.
At worst, the current crop of mega-mergers may
produce another First Republic- or Bank of New Eng-
land-like meltdown. At best, these deals probably will
produce sluggish institutions whose greatest area of
synergy is nonperforming real estate loans and whose
principal activity will be limping into line at the discount
window.
According to a recent analysis in Barron 's, five of the
sixbanks involved in pending mega-mergers-Chemical,
North Carolina National Bank (NCNB), C&S/Sovran,
BankAmerica and Security Pacific-rank among the nine
banks with the greatest commercial real estate expo-
sure.
1 On average, commercial real estate loans equaled
120 percent ofthese five banks' year-end 1990 net worth.
From first quarter 1990 to first quarter 1991, foreclosed
property rose at an average rate of 113 percent for the
five mega-merger partners. Foreclosed and problem
loans averaged 41.1 percent of the five banks' net worth
as of March 31.
Bad real estate lending isn't the only vice these banks
share. They also followed the trend to risky leveraged
buy-out (LBO) loans. At the end of 1990, all six of the
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mega-merger partners ranked among the top 20 banks
in highly leveraged transactions (HLT) lending, with a
combined $16.9 billion in HLT outstanding. That sum
represents 28 percent of all HLT exposure for the 25
lenders who account for most of the banking industry's
highly leveraged financing.2
These numbers say that bigger equals weaker, not
better. Even more important, they suggest that big banks
seeking to grow out of their problems have systemati-
cally misinvested depositors' money in unproductive
ventures that add little to the nation's economic well-
being. Why should we expect them to manage even
larger portfolios with keener regard for the bottom line
or America's economic health?
In an indirect sense, mega-mergers are destabilizing
because they offer phony substitutes for the difficult,
thoughtful changes that might actually reverse bank-
ing's fatal spiral. The longer we defer
real reform of deposit insurance,
regulatory inequalities and other
structural problems, the deeper the
industry will dig its own hole.
Economic Dislocation. Mega-
mergers will generate a number of
problems in the real economy above
and beyond the effects of additional
bailouts on public confidence, con-
sumer buying power and the availa-
bility ofpublic resources. Widespread
unemployment, concentrated in cities
that staked their development on fi-
nancial industry growth, will be the
most obvious consequence ofmega-
mergers. According to published re-
ports, the Chemical-Manufacturers
Hanover Trust (MHT) merger may
result in at least 6,000 layoffs,3 the
Nationsbank merger in 9,000 lay-
offs4 and the BankAmerica-Secu-
rity Pacific merger in 20,000 lay-
offs. 5
These layoffs have been heralded
as a sign of belt-tightening efficiency.
Yet they will disproportionately hit
lower-paid workers, like the employ-
ees a t NCNB Florida whose average
salary and benefits declined from
$17,940 in 1989 to $17,768 in 1990,
according to Sheshunoff Informa-
tion Services.6 The real fat in bank
overhead-CEO salaries, directors'
perks and the like-will never be
subjected to the indignity of a cho-
lesterol test (see Table 1).
By reducing competition, mega-
mergers will narrow the choices available to household
and business users of banking services and raise their
costs. Recent studies of commercial lending data by
Federal Reserve economists confirm the connection
between banking concentration and higher prices for
bank consumers. In addition, mega-mergers probably
will squeeze the supply of credit and other banking
services to already underserved areas of the economy.
Concentration of Wealth. These mergers will result in
excessive concentrations ofeconomic power. They threaten
to put a government seal of approval on the idea that
fewer, rather than more, people should own and control
our most basic economic resources. This past Septem-
ber, the Southern Finance Project released a study indi-
cating that 1991's mega-mergers will have profoundly
adverse effects on competition in local banking markets,
particularly those in affected areas of the West and the
TABLE 1: COMPENSATION AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS FOR MAJOR MERGING BANKS
CEO 1990 CEO 1989
AVERAGE AVERAGE CHANGE
EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT IN STOCK
1990 1989 PRICE
Chemical NY
Walter Shipley
Chemical NJ
Texas Commerce-Houston
Texas Commerce-Dallas
Manufacturers Hanover
John McGillicuddy
NCNBTX
Hugh McColl
NCNBNC
NCNB FL
NCNB SC
C&S/Sovran VA
Bennett Brown
C&S/Sovran GA
C&S/Sovran FL
C&S/Sovran TN
C&S/Sovran MD
C&S/Sovran SC
BankAmerica CA
Richard Rosenberg
Sea first
Security Pacific CA
Robert Smith
Security Pacific WA
Security Pacific AZ
Security Pacific OR
$738,167 '$1,1 1 8,430
$1,082,000 $1,680,323
$752315 $1,200,000
$880,273 $978,081
$1,600,000 $1,250,000
$789,600 $1,027,900
53,291
33,713
36,966
32,205
49,662
26,528
31,343
17,768
20,880
31,199
29,421
26,425
29,114
32,874
22,427
38,189
34,054
37,490
34,926
40,352
34,887
50,356
32,160
35,803
28,404
46,395
28.524
31,018
17,940
20,286
30,086
28.117
25.594
21,288
31,394
21,389
36.898
32,265
36,151
33.645
38,507
32,193
-64.0%
-36.2%
-50.5%
-0.9%
-49.2%
CEO 1990/1989: Total compensation includes salary, bonus, deferred compensation and other forms of
cash-equivalent compensation.
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT 1990/1989: Average salary and benefits per employee at affiliate banks.
CHANGE IN STOCK PRICE: Percent change in stock price from year-end 1989 to year-end 1990.
SOURCES: SNL Executive Compensation Review:
1991 and 1990.
1991; Sheshunoff 1000 Largest U.S. Banks,
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Southeast.7 The study shows:
• According to U.S. Justice Department guidelines, the
BankAmerica and Nationsbank deals would produce
"highly concentrated" conditions in 81 of the 99
counties in Arizona, California, South Carolina and
Washington where the merger partners currently op-
erate competing offices.
• In a quarter of those counties, post-merger concen-
tration levels would rise to more than double the
statistical threshold that signals adverse effects on
competition and triggers antitrust action.
• Despite a record of generally lax antitrust enforce-
ment during the 1980s, the Justice Department chal-
lenged a number of banking mergers over local con-
centration levels far lower than those threatened by
1991's mega-mergers. In 42 of the 99 affected counties
in Arizona, California, South Carolina and Washing-
ton, post-merger concentration levels would surpass
the levels that generated a recent federal antitrust
challenge to Fleet/Norstar's FDIC-assisted takeover
of Maine National Bank.
Bargain-basement government sales of failed banks
and thrifts to NCNB, BankAmerica and Security
Pacific will compound the anticompetitive effects of
1991's mega-mergers. The report terms the BofA-
SecPac deal "the world's largest RTC trophy case,"
since the bailout agency has furnished the two banks
with $24.6 billion in banking resources -74 percent of
all deposits sold by Resolution Trust Company (RTC)
in Western states. The extremely favorable terms of
those deals put BofA-SecPac's rivals at a double
disadvantage.
After a merger, NCNB and Bank of America would
dominate non-local banking markets for medium-
sized business borrowers in South Carolina and parts
A Proposal for Public
Purpose Banking
This outline for public purpose
banks should be considered as a broad
concept, recognizing that many de-
tails remain to be debated and re-
fined by citizens, policy makers and
public-spirited lenders whose expe-
riences provide models for such a
system. The purpose for such a sys-
tem is to restore the widespread own-
ership of financial intermediaries
while investing in a broad spectrum
of resources needed to enhance the
national economic performance and
revitalize communities. A public
purpose banking system should be
built incrementally by expanding the
existing, but tiny, infrastructure, of
public-spirited lenders through a)
the application of tough antitrust
standards to banking industry con-
solidation; and b) the resolution of
bank and thrift failures.
Ownership
Public purpose banks will be
mutually owned by their depositors.
The principal means for defining the
banks' ownership group will be the
communities they are chartered to
serve. By complying with public
purpose standards for governance,
lending and supervision, other tra-
ditional and non-traditional lenders
(community development loan funds
and credit unions, stockholder-owned
development banks and commercial
banks, hybrid intermediaries, etc.)
also could operate as publicpurpose
banks.
Governance
Public purpose banks should be
democratically governed by their
owners, who would be responsible
for selecting a majority ofeach insti-
tution's directors. Accountability
mechanisms linking management, di-
rectors and owners could include:
regular, detailed disclosure offinan-
cial information; annual independ-
ent audits; votes by owners on major
policy initiatives by the banks; and
free access by owners to the vote.
In order to prevent effective con-
trol of the institution passing to a
small number of affluent or power-
ful members (as has happened at
Farm Credit System Production
Credit Associations (PCAs) and many
mutually-owned depositories), the
board should maintain aggressive
member education and involvement
programs.
Capitalization
In order to gain the solid equity
base needed for effective interme-
diation, public purpose banks should
be able to obtain capital through the
following means:
• Equity contributions from the Tier
1 capital of megamerging Bank
Holding Companies (BHCs) that
are proportionate to the divested
branches' percentage of the merg-
ing institutions' total resources;
• Voluntary investments by state
governments, local governments
and pension funds in a special
class of restricted-voting shares;
• A portion of receipts from asset
appreciation fees levied on inves-
tors who resell RTC and FDIC
properties within five years of
purchasing them. One precedent
for this fee is the net recapture
agreement provision of the 1987
Agricultural Credit Act, which ex-
poses Farm Home Administra-
tion borrowers to an apprecia-
tion tax on farm assets.
• Tax-advantaged investments by
individuals in a limited class of
voting shares.
Sources of Funds
Public purpose banks should be
able to access funds through the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
Favorable access to the deposits of
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of the West Coast. Such firms already rely on an
narrow universe of competitors for their primary
banking relationships.
These research findings raise a number of practical
questions for state and federal antitrust enforcers. They
also raise broader questions about who will control the
nation's most vital economic functions-money crea-
tion, the payments system and financial intermediation.
The Supreme Court's landmark Philadelphia National
Bank decision addressed those broad questions with
blunt eloquence. In 1963, the Court wrote:
The fact that banking is a highly regulated industry
critical to the Nation's welfare makes the play ofcom-
petition not less important but more so. If the busi-
nessman is denied credit because his banking alterna-
tives have been eliminated by mergers, the whole
edifice of an entrepreneurial system is threatened; if
the costs of banking services and credit are allowed to
become excessive by the absence of competitive pres-
sures, virtually all costs in our credit economy will be
affected; and unless competition is allowed to fulfill
its role as an economic regulator in the banking
industry, the result may well be even more govern-
ment regulation. It is surely the case that competition
is our fundamental national economic policy, offer-
ing as it does the only alternative to the cartelization
or governmental regimentation of large portions of
the economy.
Recommendations for Change
Government should take the folowing steps to re-
spond to banking mega-mergers and the problems of
concentration, economic dislocation and financial in-
stability associated with them.
1. The standards used by federal financial regulators
megamerging and failed institutions.
Specifically, receiving the deposits
of branches divested by mega-merger
partners in order to comply with
antitrust standards; receiving, on a
first option basis, deposits of insol-
vent institutions resolved by RTC
and FDIC in insured deposit trans-
fers. Public purpose banks also should
receive preferential access to deposit
franchises resolved by RTC and FDIC
in purchase and assumption deals.
Discounted deposit insurance pre-
miums. Public purpose banks should
pay premiums at 80 percent of the
lowest prevailing assessment rate for
other insured depositories. For ex-
ample, if the lowest assessment paid
by banks, thrifts and credit unions to
the FDIC and NCUSIFwere 20 basis
points, public purpose banks would
be assessed 16 basis points.
The discount would give public
purpose banks a structural advan-
tage similar to the low-cost funding
that an earlier type of specialized
lender (S&Ls) received via interest
rate controls. Since we believe it is
necessary to reform the current
deposit insurance assessment, pref-
erence for public purpose banks
ultimately should be replaced by rate
mechanisms built into a system of
flexibility recontrolled rates.
Public Deposits. A federal require-
ment that public bodies (e.g., local
governments, school boards, port
authorities, etc.) and Pension Bene-
fit Guarantee Corporation-backed
pension funds place a designated small
percentage of their total transaction
deposits and a designated small per-
centage of their total non-transac-
tion accounts with local public pur-
pose banks.
Lending Mandate
Portfolio requirements for public
purpose banks should be character-
ized by flexibility and diversificatioa
They must reflect community eco-
nomic needs and national priorities.
• Investments in housing, commu-
nity and industrial development,
health and child care, agriculture
and environmental protection
should constitute no less than 80
percent of the banks' loans (Quali-
fied Public Lender test).
• Public purpose banks should
maintain an annual loan-to-asset
ratio that exceeds by some fixed
percentage the loan-to-asset ra-
tio (averaged over three years)
for Bank Insurance Fund-insured
institutions with less than one
billion dollars in assets.
• Loans should be made within 100
miles of the bank's headquarters
in MSAcounties and within a rea-
sonable (perhaps multi-county)
service area surrounding the bank's
headquarters in non-MSA coun-
ties. Some exemptions may be
made on a case-by-case basis for
syndicating or participating in non-
local ventures of special public
interest.
A reasonable portion ofbank loans
(the exact portion to be deter-
mined annually by the chartering
agency) should involve the banks
in state and federal credit pro-
grams consistent with their over-
all lending mission (e.g., Small
Business Administration, FmHA
etc.).
Loans to a single borrower should
be restricted. Off-balance-sheet
activities and loans to officers, di-
rectors, and their related parties
should be prohibited or severely
restricted.
Banks should have access to a
public purpose secondary market
established through their char-
tering agency.
Banks should provide their bor-
rowers debt mediation and restruc-
turing services financed by retained
earnings and a "check off system.
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to evaluate proposed bank mergers-especially large
mergers that exceed a specified size threshold-should
be clarified, codified and made public. The vague, shift-
ing, subjective and unwritten guidelines currently used
for merger reviews should be replaced by explicit written
standards that:
• Spell out the types of product and geographic mar-
kets to be analyzed;
• Quantify the benchmarks by which competitive ef-
fects are evaluated;
• Fully factor in any existing competitive advantages
that the government has conferred on the applicants;
• Eliminate the "convenience and needs" defense of
banking mergers due to its slippery meaning and
history of usage.
• Consider the effects of mergers on customers such as
middle-market businesses that use non-local banking
markets and are crucial to the health of local econo-
mies.
These measures would reduce the discretion and
enhance the public disclosure of regulatory activity.
Like complementary proposals for "early intervention"
in failing banks and restricting use of the Fed's discount
window, such initiatives would make financial regula-
tion more transparent, more consistent and more clearly
in the public interest.
2. Restrictions should be placed on the portion of
total deposits and IPC deposits that can be controlled by
any single institution on a state, county and Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area basis. If necessary, the federal bench-
mark should preempt more liberal state standards.
3. Banking regulators should direct government and
non-governmental organizations in affected areas to
conduct comprehensive social and economic impact
studies prior to approving bank mergers involving insti-
tutions whose parent companies hold combined assets
exceeding S50 billion. Ifthese studies predict substantial
social or economic dislocation, regulatory approval should
be conditioned on the implementation ofa comprehen-
sive mitigation program, funded by a merger tax on the
merging institutions.
The principal components of merger-mitigation pro-
grams should include (but not be limited to) the follow-
ing elements:
• Strict compliance with the Worker Adjustment and
(continuedfrom page 9)
Such services should be available
to distressed borrowers whose
income falls within a reasonable
standard (e.g., 120 percent) of local
median income and whose loan is
part of the bank's Qualified Pub-
lic Lender portfolio.
Regulation and Supervision
A federal agency, the Office of
Public Banks, should be created to
charter and promote the expansion
of public purpose banks. Like the
Federal Reserve and the FHLB sys-
tems, the Office should maintain re-
serves for and provide backup li-
quidity to public purpose banks. The
Office could be established on a
national, regional or state basis. The
Office should have no regulatory or
insurance functions.
A completely separate (existing
or new) federal agency should serve
as primary regulator and insurer of
public purpose banks, performing
examination and supervision func-
tions. Only a federal charter should
be available for public purpose banks;
however, existing state- or federally-
charted institutions should be al-
lowed to convert to a public purpose
charter if they meet the appropriate
ownership, governance, capitaliza-
tion, portfolio and management tests.
In addition to meeting the reserve
requirements ofthe Office of Public
Banks, public purpose institutions
should meet soundness standards
comparable to those demanded of
other insured financial institutions.
However, the primary regulator
should determine and enforce sepa-
rate risk-weighted capital and re-
serve standards for public purpose
banks. Supervision also should take
into account the case of public pur-
pose banks that choose to operate
on a not-for-profit basis. Public pur-
pose banks should operate with a
state and federal tax exemption.
Failure to comply with lending stan-
dards should result in the loss of the
exemption.
Management
Public purpose banks should
present a qualified management team
and sound management plan in or-
der to receive a charter from the
Office of Public Banks. To help stimu-
late and sustain the infusion of
managerial and technical skills
needed for public purpose banking
success:
The Office of Pub lie Banks should
maintain an active technical as-
sistance division, dedicated to the
support and continuing education
of start-up management teams.
The division should be funded by
mega-merger taxes and a fee on
clearinghouse transactions.
• Matching state-federal EDWAA
funds should be used to train and
place in public purpose banking
jobs a corps of employees who
have been laid off as a result of
banking mega-mergers. The
"Lender Corps" notion also could
be expanded to include the re-
cruitment and placement of re-
tired and other unemployed per-
sons with banking and/or man-
agement skills.
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Retraining Notification (WARN) Act's 60-day no-
tice provision.
• A mandatory 60-day consultation period, triggered
by the WARN notice, in which representatives of
employees, management and government negotiate
alternatives to a closing or layoff.
• Establishment of adjustment committees based on
the Canadian model to oversee retraining, education
and relocation programs for laid-offbank employees.
The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance Act (EDWAA) provides resources for
these joint labor-management committees to be staffed
by an independent third party. The committees are
authorized to survey dislocated workers for outplace-
ment; screen, hire and fire adjustment service provid-
ers; and monitor the re-employment process. For
instance, the United Food and Commercial Workers
have proposed a model assistance center for dislo-
cated Security Pacific and Seafirst employees.
• Use ofEDWAA funds for alternative ownership pre -
feasibility studies that draw up detailed management
plans for converting divested branches into public
purpose banks.
• A "Lender Corps" program, subsidized by EDWAA
discretionary funds and a merger tax, that retrains and
places laid-off bank employees in staff positions at
these public purpose banks. These employees would
help fill the managerial and technical gaps that nag
existing community lenders.
4. Branches divested by mega-merger partners in
order to comply with antitrust standards should be con-
verted to mutually-owned "public purpose banks" with
a lending mission that serve community needs and na-
tional economic priorities. Branches and franchises in
RTC and FDIC conservatorship also should be eligible
for conversion to public purpose banks (see sidebar).
Such banks could be given or sold on a preferential
basis to existing development banks, community devel-
opment credit unions, community development loan
funds or similar intermediaries. Another possibility is
that these banks be chartered separately on the credit
union model, with the community defined as the affinity
group. State and local government units could also
invest in such banks as could pension funds. Portfolio
requirements would reflect broad national investment
needs as well as diversification and other prudent stan-
dards.
The principle behind public purpose banking is simple.
If the government is going to promote or condone a
dramatic concentration in ownership and control of
banking resources, it should simultaneously support a
second tier of financial institutions better attuned to the
nation's credit needs and the American tradition of
widespread economic ownership.
The two-tiered approach is a long-standing reality in
some countries, including nations whose ostensibly
centralized banking systems are relentlessly cited as the
wave of the future by bank consolidation advocates in
the U.S. For example, the German banking system is
best known for its handful ofmammoth universal banks.
But the country also hosts.and promotes through public
policy, a flourishing tier of smaller financial intermedi-
aries that includes thousands of cooperative banks, savings
banks, mortgage banks and postal savings offices. Even
though these smaller institutions have undergone a
merger boom in recent years, Germany still has more
banking institutions per capita than the U.S. has banks
and thrifts.
5. All financial firms should be subject to uniform
licensing and regulation and should meet a modicum of
public obligations in return for their license. The S&L
experience demonstrates the foolishness of leveling the
playing field by lowering it to a less-regulated common
denominator. In order to stabilize the financial system
and achieve real regulatory equality, comparablesound-
ness requirements (capital and reserve standards, dis-
closure, etc.) and prohibitions against conflict of inter-
est and unfair competition should be applied to any
entity that: directly accepts funds from the public for
investment; makes loans to the public using funds other
than its own equity capital and retained earnings; or sells
loans to financial institutions or investors.
Regulatory equality is not an answer to mega-mergers
perse. Rather, it represents an alternative to the banking
industry's broad program of consolidation and decon-
trol. It may or may not imply "more" regulation; itwould
certainly provide smarter regulation. As the body count
mounts in the financial industry, the nation needs to
debate and implement real reform, rather than permit-
ting mega-mergers to delay the banking system's day of
reckoning and make that day vastly more expensive to
taxpayers.
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